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In October, 1998 the Secretary of Agriculture and the Governor of Oregon announced that
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the State of Oregon would join together in an
initiative to help restore fresh water ecosystems that provide habitat for salmon and trout listed
under the Federal Endangered Species Act. The partnership was formed through USDA’s
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), a joint federal and state conservation
program that targets significant environmental issues related to agriculture. The CREP is a
voluntary program that uses financial incentives to encourage farmers and ranchers to enroll in the
Conservation Reserve Program. In response to declining native fish populations, Oregon’s CREP
requires that all participants suspend production on their riparian land for up to 15 years and
convert it to one of three riparian conservation practices; forested buffer, filter strip or wetland
restoration. Approximately $250 million is available to enroll up to 95,000 acres of riparian land
and 5,000 acres of wetland along streams where native salmon and trout exist or are known to
have historically existed.
The goal of this study is to model the probability of participation in Oregon’s CREP as a
function of the incentive payment and a vector of socio-economic variables. A secondary goal is
to determine possible reasons for nonparticipation. Obtaining non-participant information
increases the range of possible policy instruments to encourage enrollment (Lohr & Park, 1994).
An Economic Approach to Assessing the Probability of Participation
Eliciting a landowner’s willingness to participate in Oregon’s CREP is analogous to the types of
questions typically addressed in contingent valuation (CV) studies. For the purpose of obtaining
valuation responses, a dichotomous choice (DC) approach is preferred to direct elicitation
(Department of Commerce, 1995). With the dichotomous choice format, the respondent is asked
to provide a “yes” or “no” response to a particular bid contained in the participation question,2
where the bid amount is varied across the respondents.  Rather than attempting to identify an
individual’s profit function to determine a minimum incentive to induce participation,
dichotomous choice allows for determining whether or not an individual’s minimum willingness
to accept (WTA) is less than or equal to the offered incentive payment.
Economic theory provides some insight as to how respondents make the decisions
necessary to complete a dichotomous choice question. The participation decision process can be
modeled as a random utility model, assuming that the axioms of rational choice and utility theory
are met
1. When individuals are presented with the dichotomous choice of participation in
Oregon’s CREP they are faced with comparing their utility with and without participation. From
utility theory, an individual will accept $A to enroll in Oregon’s CREP if the individual perceives
him or herself as better off with the incentive payment and the program than without; i.e., if
U(0,y;x) < U(1,y+A;x), where 0 is the initial state and 1 is the state where the individual
participates in Oregon’s CREP, y is an individual’s income, A is a “net” incentive payment and x
is a vector of additional attributes that may influence the participation decision. Allowing variable
A to be the net incentive payment assumes that the pecuniary costs of participation and non-
participation are considered. Because an individual’s utility, U(i,y;x), is unknown it can be
considered a random variable for the researcher. The observable portion of an individual’s utility
function can be denoted by the indirect utility function V(i,y;x), the mean of the random variable,
U. Through addition of an independent and identically distributed (iid) error term, ε i, the
individual’s decision to accept $A and participate in Oregon’s CREP can be re-expressed as:
V(0,y;x) + ε
0 < V(1,y+A;x) + ε
1.( 1 )
                                                       
1 For discussion of utility theory and the axioms of rational choice see Nicholson, 1995 pages 75-80.3
If V(i,y;x) = x’β
i + α y, where α  >0, for i = 0,1, then an individual will accept $A and participate
in the program when; x’β
0 + α y + ε
0  < x’β
1 + α( y+A) + ε
1 (2)
2
Following Cooper and Keim (1996), the decision to accept $A and participate in the program can
be expressed in probability framework as:











0 = ∆ V= x’β  +    α A and x’β  =   x’β
1 - x’β
0. (3)
Maximum likelihood procedures are used to fit a logit model to the cumulative probability
of participation. The logistic distribution used to model the probability of participation is: pr(yes)
= [1+ e
-(∆ V)]
-1 = [1+ e
-( 
x’β   +    α A)]
-1 (refer to equation 3); where x is a vector of attributes aside from
the bid offer that may influence the participation decision, β   is a vector of estimated coefficients
related to the attributes, α  is the coefficient on the bid variable, and A is the bid variable. When
the probability of accepting the bid equals 0.5, the average individual will be indifferent between
a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response given the mean bid value and mean values of the additional explanatory
attributes. Thus, the median WTA can be derived by setting the probability of accepting the bid
equal to 0.5 and solving for A.
Conceptual Framework for the Economic Model
Development of the conceptual framework for analyzing the participation decision was
based upon a review of literature pertaining to adoption of various conservation practices. The
traditional diffusion of innovation model (Rogers, 1962; Napier et al., 1988; and Camboni et al.,
1990) and the farm structure-institutional constraints perspective (Napier et al., 1988 and 1994;
Camboni et al., 1990; Lohr & Park, 1994; and Cooper & Keim, 1996) were particularly useful in
deciding which variables should be included in the WTA model. Previous studies have focused on
                                                       
2 Adapted from Cooper and Keim, 19964
identifying socioeconomic characteristics of landowners and their property that are correlated
with decisions to adopt conservation practices. Typical factors hypothesized to influence the
participation decision include financial incentives, income, land value, farm size, tenure, age, and
environmental attitudes and perceptions (Lant, 1991; McLean-Meyinsse et al., 1994; Lohr &
Park, 1994; Cooper & Keim, 1996; Lant et al., 1995a,b; and Konyar & Osborne, 1990).
Riparian landowners, in general, recognize the limited direct benefits of adopting
conservation practices meant to reduce off-site damages to freshwater habitat and water quality.
Under Oregon’s CREP, establishing forested riparian buffer strips means foregoing production
possibilities in the riparian area for periods of up to 15 years. Contracts lasting up to 15 years
prohibit landowners from changing management in their riparian areas regardless of commodity
prices or additional farm program incentives. In addition, there are costs associated with
establishing and maintaining permanent forest cover for the buffer strip; cost-share available
through Oregon’s CREP only covers 75% of the cost of establishing the practice and a $5 per acre
per year maintenance payment. For each individual there is a threshold where the benefits from
receiving a guaranteed yearly payment compensates for the loss in production revenue, the cost of
establishing and maintaining the buffer strip and the risk involved with participation.
The relationship between the payment offered and the participation decision is
hypothesized to be conditioned on sociological and past experience variables as well as 3
economic constraints: opportunity costs, future expectations, and preferences (Table 1).
The opportunity cost of an action is the value of the foregone alternative action (Pearce, 1992).
For an individual to consider participation in Oregon’s CREP the yearly payment should
compensate for the expected revenue foregone (either direct or indirect) over the contract period.5
An individual’s expectation about the future determines their planning horizon and may be a
critical component influencing the participation decision. Future expectations regarding product
prices, environmental regulation, and planned retirement are all components hypothesized to
influence the participation decision. Preferences, past experiences and sociological demographics
provide the guidelines by which individuals make utility maximizing decisions.
Table 1: Variables Expected to Influence the Participation Decision
Categories & Expected
Variables Variable Description Relationship
    PAYMENT Annual payment for participation +
Opportunity Costs
    ACRES Total acreage of the property +
    HIGHLAND Total acreage dedicated to high value crops -
    LOWLAND Total acreage dedicated to low value production +
    FARMINC Percent of income from farm sources -
Future Expectations
    PLNRET2 Planned retirement within 10 years +
    SB Compliance with SB 1010 +
    REGUL Compliance with future regulations +
    FLX Flexibility of future land use -
Preferences
    ENVIMP Low importance placed on fish & water quality -
    ENVSAT Low satisfaction with fish & water quality  +
    ENVPER No perception of an environmental problem -
    AG Required interaction with a State or Federal Agency  -
    NEIB Acceptance by neighboring landowners +
    SHARE Availability of cost-share  +
    EC Reduced economic returns -
Sociological
    AGE Age of respondent -
    EDUX Completion of some education beyond high school +
    RET Retired +
Past Experience
    CRP Familiarity with Conservation Reserve Program +
    CREP Prior knowledge about Oregon’s CREP +
    PRGPART2 Past participation in a USDA program +
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Survey Design and Population Description
The entire population of riparian landowners along 5 streams in Union County and 6
streams in Washington County was surveyed for their willingness to participate in Oregon’s
CREP following the Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978). These counties were chosen to reflect
the diverse climate and management regimes in Oregon. Situated west of the Cascade Mountain6
Range, in the Willamette Valley, annual precipitation in Washington County ranges 0.54 inches
during the summer months to 6.59 inches during the winter. Union County, located in the
Northeast, receives significantly less precipitation, ranging from 0.61 inches in the summer to
1.64 inches in the spring. Temperatures also vary between the two counties: Union has colder
winters and longer periods of dry, hot summer weather. The mean maximum and minimum
temperatures are 83.7 and 23.5 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. Extreme high’s and lows range
from 108 to –24 degrees F. Washington County, under maritime influences, has a more temperate
climate with mean maximum and minimum temperatures of 80.5 and 33.3 degrees F,
respectively. Extreme high and low temperatures range from 106 to –2 degrees F. Climatic
variability accounts for the different management regimes among the counties. Individual
producers in Union County are predominantly involved in the ranching industry, with a limited
amount of land dedicated to irrigated crops. Washington county producers have a more diverse
cropping system with land dedicated to vegetables, berries, nuts, grass etc. with limited
involvement in ranching.
In a mail survey, we presented 216 Union County and 1116 Washington County riparian
landowners with a hypothetical opportunity to accept or reject an annual payment to participate in
Oregon’s CREP. The questionnaire provided a brief description of the benefits that might accrue
to society, the operational components of the program, the enhanced incentives offered, and the
program requirements. Recognizing the difference in value between irrigated and dry land, one of
the enhanced incentives included an increased annual payment for irrigated land. Consistent with
dichotomous choice, each respondent was asked to either accept or reject the specified annual
payment to enter into Oregon’s CREP. Respondents who were unwilling to participate were asked
to complete scaled response questions as to possible reasons for their non-participation decision.7
All respondents were asked to identify reasons that potentially make a difference in their decision
to establish buffer strips as well as descriptive data about themselves and their property.
Of the 1332 surveys distributed to the population, the overall response rate was 63.7%
(65.3% in Union County and 63.3% in Washington County). Data was analyzed from 290
respondents who identified eligible land for Oregon’s CREP; 123 of these could not be used in
the logit analysis due to incomplete responses to critical analysis variables. 500 questionnaires
were returned by respondents ineligible to participate in CREP because the they did not own
riparian land or did not meet the requirements of the CREP program (cropped two of the past 5
years or grazed within the last 5 years). 28 questionnaires were declined and 47 questionnaires
were sent to wrong addresses. Descriptive statistics for the 167 observations analyzed in the logit
model are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Mean statistics of the populations
 Variable Dry Land Respondents Irrigated Land Respondents
    ACRES 1069.4 157.3
    HIGHLAND 30.943 56.062
    LOWLAND 49.108 59.716
    FARMINC 25.89 47.855
    PLNRET2* 0.26371 0.32895
    SB* 0.46154 0.61842
    REGUL* 0.52747 0.59211
    FLX* 0.75824 0.85526
    ENVIMP** 1.4474
    ENVSAT** 3.0989
    ENVPER** 1.4066 1.5395
    AG* 0.56597
    NEIB* 0.28571 0.32895
    SHARE* 0.61538 0.72368
    EC* 0.48352 0.75
    AGE 58.132 54.934
    EDUX* 0.85714 0.77632
    RET* 0.13158
    CRP*** 2.3297 2.2237
    CREP* 0.64474
    PRGPART2* 0.40659 0.46053
* Interpreted as percentage. ** Interpreted on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = very important, very satisfied, strongly perceived;
5 = unimportant, not satisfied and not perceived, respectively). *** Interpreted on scale of 1 to 3 (1 = very familiar,
2 = somewhat familiar and 3 = not at all familiar).8
Results
Separate econometric models, were analyzed for dry land riparian landowners and irrigators. Both
models have a high percentage of correct prediction, 90.1% and 92.1% respectively, indicating
that the models do a good job of predicting the response to the ‘willingness to participate’
question. Estimated coefficients and their respective T-ratio’s for both models are provided in
table 3.
Table 3: Logit Model Parameter Estimates for the Participation Decision
Dry Land Irrigated Land
Variable Coefficient  (T-Ratio) Coefficient  (T-Ratio)
    BID 0.048 (2.58)
2 -0.041 (-2.22)
2
    PUNION 0.013   (0.30) 0.171    (2.36)
2
ACRES 0.002   (-0.83) 0.035    (2.24)
2
    HIGHLAND -0.007  (-0.57) -0.041   (-2.05)
2
    LOWLAND 0.012   (1.65)
4 -0.042   (-2.32)
2
    FARMINC -0.052  (-2.37)
2 0.034    (1.30)
4
    PLNRET2 -2.189  (-1.51)
4 6.714    (2.41)
2
    SB 2.377  (2.03)
2 -1.100   (-0.90)
    REGUL -2.203   (-1.86)
3 2.587    (1.75)
3
    FLX -2.314  (-1.76)
3 -9.575   (-2.45)
1
    ENVIMP -2.509   (-1.78)
3
    ENVSAT -0.517  (-1.24)
    ENVPER -1.148   (-1.15) -2.807   (-2.90)
1
    AG -2.346   (-1.80)
3
    NEIB 3.955    (2.70)
1 0.665    (0.55)
    SHARE 5.179    (3.07)
1 3.812   (2.28)
2
    EC -2.280   (-1.80)
3 3.806    (2.27)
2
    AGE -0.068   (-1.66)
4 -0.076 (-1.02)
    EDUX -3.934  (-2.10)
2 5.039    (2.55)
1
    RET 6.162    (1.98)
3
    CRP 0.658    (0.83) 2.657    (1.87)
3
    CREP 1.472    (0.83)
    PRGPART2 1.586    (1.45)
4 -1.708   (-1.22)
    INTERCEPT 8.092 (1.06) 1.371 (0.31)
    N 76 91
    Observations at 1 38 34
    Observations at 0 38 57
    Percentage of correct
    Predictions 90.1 92.1
    Estimated Mean WTA
Union County $144.38 $149.87
Washington County $194.99 $204.55
1 Significant at the 1% level. 
2 Significant at the 2.5% level. 
3 Significant at the 5% level.
4 Significant at the 10% level. The dependent variable is participation in Oregon’s CREP (1 if yes).9
The influence of the yearly payment (BID), as expected, significantly influences the
participation decision under all circumstances. In order to separate the influence of the BID for
Union and Washington County respondents (for both dry and irrigated land), a dummy variable
was added to the analysis. The dummy variable (PUNION) was the product of the bid rate offered
and a county dummy (1 if Union). Inclusion of this variable allowed for an independent
coefficient on the BID variable and an independent calculation of the mean willingness to accept
(WTA). The coefficient of the BID variable is positive for both Union and Washington County
dry land respondents as well as for Union County irrigators, however; the coefficient is negative
for Washington County irrigators. This latter result is unexpected but may be related to the
diversity of irrigated crops grown in the county and the limited range of bids offered to the
respondents.
3
The variables chosen to represent the “opportunity cost” further help explain the
participation decision. Landowners who dedicate their acreage to producing high value crops, as
expected, have a decreased probability of participation for both irrigated and dry land (significant
only for irrigated land). Also as expected, landowners dedicating their dry land to haying or
grazing have an increased probability of participation. However, irrigators who dedicate their land
to haying or grazing have a decreased probability of establishing forested riparian buffer strips
through Oregon’s CREP. This latter result is not surprising as irrigated riparian land dedicated to
grazing and producing hay is often times the most productive land of the property. It is not
unreasonable to expect the probability of participation to decrease for these types of producers.
                                                       
3 A recent Maryland CREP focus group, including 364 farmers, indicated that the incentives offered were not a major
factor in improving the impression of the program or increasing likely participation. Some farmers participating in the
focus group indicated that their interest in the program had little to do with financial incentives because these
incentives only marginally affected their “bottom-line” (NA, 1999)10
Future expectations appeared to significantly influence participation for both irrigators and
non-irrigators. Results indicate that individuals who place importance on the flexibility of future
land use will be less likely to participate in CREP. Perhaps this indicates that the contract periods
are too long in duration or do not provide for enough flexibility. This result is consistent with
previous researchers who have found that allowing flexibility in conservation programs will
increase participation rates (Purvis, 1989; Lant, 1991). The importance of a conservation program
to provide compliance with current or future land use regulations was significant but of opposite
sign for irrigators and non-irrigators. It appears that the more importance placed on compliance
with future regulations the less likely dry land riparian owners are to participate in CREP, while
the opposite is true for irrigators.
Preferences, sociological variables and past experience also help explain participation.
Landowners recognize the benefits of the cost-share component of Oregon’s CREP. Individuals
who place importance on the availability of cost-share to establish conservation practices have an
increased probability of participation. The perception of an environmental issue needing to be
addressed on streamside property also increases the likelihood of participation. Respondents were
asked to assess how strongly they agreed (1) or disagreed (5) with the need to address a number
of environmental issues on the streams running through their property. As the level of
disagreement increased the probability of participation decreased.
The mean WTA for irrigators and non-irrigators for each county is provided in Table 3. It
is of interest to note that each of the estimates is at the high end of (or exceeds) the values
currently being offered by the Farm Service Agency for participation in Oregon’s CREP. Also of
interest is the small difference between the mean WTA for irrigated and dry land in each of the11
counties. This difference was expected to be larger as estimates indicate that on average irrigated
land rents for twice the rate of dry land in Oregon.
While the results from the logit analysis may assist policy makers in their efforts to
understand the factors that influence participation in Oregon’s CREP, perhaps of equal interest
are the reasons why respondents chose not to participate in the program. Respondents who
indicated that they would not participate in Oregon’s CREP were asked to address possible
reasons for not participating. The mean results of these questions are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Mean Responses of Unwilling Respondents*
Reason N Mean Standard Deviation
A. Annual payment insufficient ….. 153 2.3 1.11
B. Too expensive to establish
conservation practice …………. 153 2.5 1.12
C. Too expensive to maintain
conservation practice …………. 153 2.3 1.07
D. Reduced flexibility to change
land uses as economic conditions
warrant  ……………………….. 158 1.8 1.00
 E. Interference with management
of remaining property ………… 155 2.1 1.18
F. Riparian land is too productive
to convert to “no-use” ………... 151 2.4 1.20
G. Concern about restrictions at the
end of the contract period ……. 157 1.6 0.96
H. I do not want to enter into a
contractual arrangement with the
federal government …………… 162 2.0 1.11
I.  I do not want to enter into a
contractual arrangement with the
state government ……………… 160 2.0 1.10
J.  Opinions from neighboring land
owners prevents me from considering
enrollment …………………….. 150 3.7 1.13
K. I believe that riparian areas can
be restored with proper
management …………………. 154 1.8 0.89
* 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neutral; 4 = disagree; 5 = strongly disagree
Of the original 290 survey’s used in the analysis, 171 individuals indicated that they would not
participate in the program, 103 indicated a positive willingness to participate and 16 declined to
answer the question. The number of respondents (N) to each statement varies due to the fact that12
some respondents did not address all of the reasons provided in the questionnaire. It appears that
the primary reasons for non-participation include reduced flexibility to change land use as
economic conditions warrant, concern over restrictions at the end of the contract, and a strong
belief that riparian areas can be restored through proper management. In addition, a number of
respondents indicated that they already have a riparian buffer strip in place.
Policy Implications
These results indicate that approximately 50% of irrigators and 37% of dry land riparian
landowners will participate in Oregon’s CREP, as described in the questionnaire, at yearly
payments close to those currently offered. Some changes, or clarification, of Oregon’s CREP may
assist in increasing participation. While the annual payment offered influences participation, it is
clearly not the sole driver of the participation decision. Increasing the annual payment may induce
participation, but other changes to the program may be necessary as well. Clarifying the
regulations that pertain to enrolled land at the end of the contract period appears to be essential. In
addition, providing flexibility for land management during the contract seems desirable.
Communication between land owners and resource agencies may also help to increase
participation as those who perceive a need to address environmental issues are more responsive to
the program.
The mixed findings for the importance of compliance with current or future land use
regulations may imply that some respondents do not perceive these regulations as pertaining to
their property. Agencies may want to communicate with landowners regarding whether their land
management practices meet current and anticipated water quality regulations and the key role that
conservation programs can play.13
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